FCA Wants Property Funds to Stop Promising Liquidity They…
The regulator wants redemption terms to match the assets that funds actually hold. That is a more fundamental intervention than simply requiring additional risk warnings. A fund cannot make a commercial building liquid by offering investors daily dealing.
Who Pays When Investors Rush for the Exit?
When withdrawal requests accelerate, managers first use cash reserves and then may need to sell assets. Property transactions involve valuation, negotiations and settlement delays. Forced sales can impose discounts on the fund and disadvantage investors who remain after early redeemers are paid.
The alternative is suspension, which can protect the portfolio from a fire sale but leaves investors unable to access their money when they may need it most. The risk is not theoretical: FinanceFeeds covered the Woodford fund liquidity failures and subsequent FCA action, although the present consultation concerns a defined category of funds and should not be conflated with that case. The FCA argues that longer notice periods would give managers time to plan sales and make liquidity-driven suspensions less likely.
There is a second cost: funds promising frequent redemptions may hold extra cash instead of investing in their intended assets. That can dilute returns and change the exposure investors thought they were buying. A notice period may allow more consistent investment, though it does not eliminate valuation or liquidity risk.
Ninety Days Is a Restriction, Not a Guarantee
Under the proposal, investors would need to give at least 90 days’ notice before accessing funds, with longer periods possible where the asset mix warrants them. The notice period improves planning; it does not guarantee that every redemption will be paid under every market condition.
That distinction matters for financial advisers. A fund requiring three months’ notice is unsuitable as a substitute for immediately accessible savings. Distributors will need to explain the trade-off before a client invests rather than during a stressed withdrawal.
Existing funds would receive two years to comply, and investors would receive at least one year’s notice. Those transition arrangements may themselves influence redemption behaviour if investors prefer to exit before dealing terms change. The FCA will need to weigh that possibility as it finalises the framework.
A More Honest Product Design
The proposal aligns with international efforts to reduce liquidity mismatches in open-ended funds. It also illustrates a regulatory shift from managing the consequences of a run to changing the promises that make a run more damaging.
Michelle Beck, the FCA’s Director of Markets, said funds should be clearer about whether they offer quick access or are built for longer-term assets such as property. That is the policy trade-off: less convenient access in normal conditions in exchange for a structure less likely to fail during stress.
For managers, the next questions concern operational implementation, valuation cycles, investor communications and the treatment of existing holdings. For investors, the central question is simpler: when they are told a fund is open-ended, how quickly can they actually get their money back? The FCA wants that answer to reflect the underlying market, not an optimistic dealing schedule.